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ABSTRACT
We exploit time and spatial variation generated by the commodities 
boom to measure the effect of natural resources on human capital 
formation in Peru, a country with low governance indicators. Com-
bining test scores from over two million students and district-level 
administrative data on mining production and the redistribution of 
mining taxes to local governments, we find no effect from production. 
However, redistribution of mining taxes increases math test scores by 
0.23 standard deviations. We identify the improvements in the quality 
of teachers and in school infrastructure, together with increases in 
adult employment and health outcomes of adults and children, as 
key mechanisms from the redistribution. Policy implications for the 
avoidance of the natural resource curse are discussed. 
JEL Codes: H7, H23, I25, O15, Q32 
Key words: Resource booms, academic achievement, intergovernmen-
tal transfers

 INTRODUCTION
A long-standing question in the economics literature explores wheth-
er natural resource abundance is a curse or a blessing. The recent com-
modities boom has brought back this discussion. While the impact 
of such boom on aggregate economic growth has been explored else-
where,2 the study of the linkages between the abundance of natural 
resources and human capital formation still requires deeper analysis. 
For instance, cross-country correlations indicate a negative relation-
ship, suggesting that natural capital crowds out human capital (Gylfa-
son, 2001; Birdsall et al., 2001).3 Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, there 
is a strong negative association between a country’s reliance on natural 
resources and its performance on international standardized tests.
Moreover, despite the natural resource windfall revenues, it re-
mains an open question whether the provision of additional resources 
to public schools would improve students’ learning outcomes (e.g., 
Hanushek, 1996; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Glewwe and Muralid-
haran, 2016). For instance, as seen in Figure 2, a cross-country scat-
ter plot shows a positive association between tests scores and school 
resources per student. Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider all these 
correlations as causal due to the possible presence of unobserved fac-
tors across countries. 
2 See Aragon et al. (2015), Ross (2014), van der Ploeg (2011), Deacon (2011), Rosser 
(2006) and Stevens (2003), for comprehensive literature reviews.
3 There is also evidence that good political institutions can ameliorate this outcome 
(Kronenberg, 2004; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006)
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In this regard, the within-country and micro evidence exploits 
a single-commodity boom, such as coca in Colombia (Angrist and 
Kugler, 2008) and oil in Brazil (Caselli and Michaels, 2013), and 
documents some positive but modest impacts of natural resource 
abundance on school attendance and attainment, as well as literacy 
rates. While important, this advancement remains incomplete, given 
the increasing emphasis on learning outcomes—as the quality of edu-
cation in developing countries is poor (Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2010; Kremer et al, 2013). Furthermore, differences in the quality of 
education appear to be more important than access to education in 
explaining the economic performance of countries over the past fifty 
years (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012). Thus, a pending question 
centers on whether the abundance of natural resources affects human 
capital accumulation beyond traditional measures and more towards 
the indicators used in Figures 1 and 2.
We address this gap by analyzing the impact of natural resource 
abundance on students’ math and reading skills in Peru, a country 
that consistently underperforms in the World Bank’s governance 
measures relative to their geographical and income-level counterparts 
(Kaufmann et al, 2011). The country offers a unique opportunity to 
evaluate this question for several reasons. First, Peru’s poor results in 
international achievement tests (see figures above),4 played an impor-
tant role in the creation of a national standardized test: the Evalua-
ción Censal de Estudiantes, that since 2007 evaluates yearly the math 
and reading learning of second graders nationwide. Hence, math and 
4 The country is consistently one of the worst performing nations in the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) that includes OECD and developing countries. 
Peru is also the second from the bottom among countries in the Latin American Laboratory 
for Assessment of the Quality of Education, performing only better than the Dominican 
Republic.
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reading test scores serve as our proxy for human capital accumulation 
and allow us to focus on quality measures rather than access. 
Second, during the 2000s, Peru benefited from the commodities 
boom and during the period of our analysis (2007-2012) the country 
exported over 127.9 billion US dollars in minerals (excluding oil and 
gas, which are of low relevance). Today, the sector accounts for nearly 
two-thirds of the value of country’s exports.5 However, the country 
does not rely on just one mineral. Peru is one of the world top pro-
ducers of silver, tin, zinc, copper and gold (USGS, 2015). This variety 
allows us to exploit time and spatial variation in the value of mining 
production observed in this period. While most mineral prices in-
creased drastically, a few of them plummeted (see Appendix Figure 
A1). For instance, localities producing lead and iron observed more 
than a threefold increase in the value of their exports compared to 
those producing silver and zinc, where exports reduced by half over 
same period. This multiplicity of commodities in one country permits 
us to avoid the limitation on the external validity faced by previous 
studies that focused on a single commodity.
Third, we are able to match a unique administrative dataset col-
lecting the value of mineral production at the district level with close 
to 2.1 million student records obtained from the national standard-
ized test mentioned previously. 
Furthermore, mining revenues constitute around half of the 
taxes collected by Peru’s central government and these revenues have 
been partially redistributed to local governments. Indeed, the Canon 
Minero Law (from here on canon), introduced in 2001, states that 50 
5 See Appendix Figure A1 for the evolution of mining exports and prices of the main 
commodities. Note also that Peru has a long history of mining production that precedes 
colonial times (Dell, 2010). Since colonization, mining production is almost exclusively 
sent overseas.
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percent of the income tax paid by mining companies to the central 
government must be redistributed to the regional and local govern-
ments located in the areas where minerals are extracted. This legal 
framework also establishes a redistribution rule that grants transfers to 
non-producing districts located in the same region of the producing 
districts. During the period of analysis, the sum of canon transfers was 
8.9 billion US$. In 2012 alone, the central government transferred 
US$1.9 billion as canon; six times the budget allocated to the coun-
try’s antipoverty conditional cash transfer program (Juntos) and 1.8 
times the entire budget of the Ministry of Social Development, which 
is in charge of all welfare programs. There is also an important varia-
tion across space and time. Canon transfers differ significantly even 
among the top recipients over our period of analysis.6 Thus, the Peru-
vian case allows us to distinguish the impact on learning outcomes of 
mining production from redistribution policies as measured by canon 
transfers to local governments.
We exploit the spatial and time variation in the value of mining 
production to estimate its impact on math and reading test scores. Our 
difference-in-differences approach reveals a null impact of (the value) 
of production on test scores, which is robust to several specifications. 
However, using the additional space and time variation that arises from 
the redistribution of the mining taxes to local governments, we find 
that canon transfers have a positive and statistically significant effect 
on math test scores. We find smaller (and sometimes negative) effects 
for reading, but they are not statistically significant. These findings re-
main unchanged when considering several robustness tests, including 
controls for the value of mining production. Furthermore, two placebo 
tests further validate our approach: a falsification exercise where we 
6 See Appendix Figure A2 for an example of this variation.
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incorrectly assign canon transfers of one district to a randomly selected 
district in the country, as well as a placebo test limiting the sample to 
private schools. As expected, both tests show no impact on students’ 
academic achievement, reinforcing the validity of our approach.
Following the political economy literature (e.g., Caselli 2015), 
we test for the presence of non-monotonic effects of canon transfers. 
Resource booms could affect the behavior of the local incumbent in a 
non-linear fashion. Political competition increases as natural resource 
rents increase and this competition works as a discipline device, creat-
ing incentives for investments in public goods provision such as hu-
man capital. However, when rents are too high, incumbents have a 
significant amount of fiscal resources, which allows them to influence 
electoral outcomes by buying-off citizens’ electoral support and re-
ducing competition. Incumbents will have fewer incentives to invest 
in human capital, for example, since their ability to maintain power is 
less likely to be challenged. 
We find evidence in favor of non-monotonic effects. For the av-
erage district receiving a positive transfer, our estimates suggest an 
increase in math test scores of around 0.23 standard deviations. These 
effects are larger than the majority of interventions using randomized 
controlled trials considered in Kremer et al. (2013).
We use additional administrative data, as well as household sur-
veys, to explore some of the possible mechanisms behind our findings. 
For instance, we show that year-to-year variation in canon transfers is 
associated with higher expenditure on education at the local govern-
ment. We complement this with an analysis at the school level, where 
we find that canon transfers lead to an increase in the quality of teach-
ers and positive investments in school infrastructure (e.g., electricity 
and sanitation). On the other hand, we do not observe changes in 
school enrollment, ruling out the possibility that the impact of canon 
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transfers on test scores is driven by population effects (i.e., areas with 
larger windfalls could attract families with children).
Our findings are in line with recent papers exploring the effects 
of resource windfalls on the behavior of the local government.7 For ex-
ample, Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that oil-rich municipalities 
in Brazil increase their spending on public goods, but they find mixed 
results on welfare-relevant outcomes such as household income. Rath-
er, the authors argue that municipal officials used public funds for 
patronage, rent sharing and possible embezzlement.
Unlike Brazil, canon transfers seem to be less likely to generate 
malfeasance. Ardanaz and Maldonado (2016) show that districts ben-
efiting from canon transfers in Peru were more efficient in their use 
of the fiscal windfalls. Furthermore, Loayza and Rigolini (2016) and 
Zambrano et al. (2014) show that areas benefiting from Peru’s mining 
boom and canon transfers saw significant reductions in their poverty 
levels. While we cannot properly test it with our framework, it is pos-
sible that strict regulations limiting the use of canon resources explain 
the differences with Caselli and Michael’s findings. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly 
describe the institutional setting of the Peruvian Canon law. In sec-
tions 3 and 4, respectively, we present the data sources and the iden-
tification strategy. In Section 5 we present our results, including our 
robustness checks. In Section 6 we summarize our findings.
7 They are also related to a vast literature evaluating the effect of school resources on student 
performance (e.g., Hanushek, 2006).
8 This law has as a historical antecedent: the Oil Canon, which was established in 1976 
during the military government through Decree-Law 21678 after the discovery of oilfields 
in the Peruvian Amazon. It was later modified in 1992 to include mining activities and 
stated that 20 percent of the income tax should be allocated to the areas in which the 
profits were generated. The Canon Law explored in our paper was established by the 
government of President Valentín Paniagua, who came to power after Alberto Fujimori 
resigned from the presidency in September of 2000.
9 The original law of 2001 established that 20 percent of the transfers should be assigned to 
the municipalities of the province where the mineral is extracted, 60 percent to the other 
provinces in the region and the remaining 20 percent to the regional government. This 
was changed in 2003 (Law 28077) and again in 2004 (Law 28322) where the distribution 
applied during our period of analysis was established. 
 1. LOCAL TRANSFERS IN PERU: THE CASE OF THE 
CANON MINERO
Several countries have implemented mechanisms that share the taxes 
and royalties paid by extractive companies with subnational govern-
ments. This has been associated with an important expansion of fiscal 
resources in resource-rich countries, creating opportunities to improve 
the living conditions of citizens (Brosio and Jimenez, 2012). In the 
case of Peru, the Law 27506 or Ley del Canon (Canon Law), approved 
in 2001, states that the 50 percent of the income tax paid by mining 
companies should be allocated to the regional and local governments 
located in the areas where minerals are extracted. 
The Canon Law was not related to the commodity boom—in-
creases in mineral prices would take place later in the decade—but 
rather was implemented as part of the country’s decentralization 
process during the final days of the transitional government.8 After 
several amendments to the original law,9 it was established in 2004 
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that canon should be distributed according to the following rule: 10 
percent to the municipality of the district where the resources are ob-
tained, 25 percent to the municipalities located in the province where 
the producing district is located, 40 percent to the municipalities lo-
cated in the region where the resource is exploited and 25 percent to 
the regional government in which the producing district is located.10
From a fiscal perspective, local governments in Peru play a very 
marginal role; the central government collects 97% of taxes (Polastri 
and Rojas, 2007). Local governments’ ability to establish taxes or mar-
ginal rates is very limited. Property taxes (vehicles, real estate and real 
estate transfer) are the main source of local tax revenues for Peruvian 
municipalities (90% in 2007), while production and consumption 
taxes play a small role, representing at most 13% of local govern-
ments’ current incomes (Calvo-Gonzalez et al., 2010). Consequent-
ly, local governments are highly dependent on central government 
transfers, representing three-fourths of the local government budget 
(Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2012). 
Around one-third of these transfers are universally distributed 
among local governments through the “Fondo de Compensación Mu-
nicipal” (Municipal Compensation Fund); the rest are allocated as 
targeted transfers. From these targeted transfers, canon (which may 
come from mining, oil, hydropower, forest and gas) represents a 91% 
of the total targeted transfers, being the mining canon the most im-
portant one (72% of all canon transfers, representing 29% of local 
governments’ budgets). In some mineral-producer districts, canon 
can accounts for as much as 70% of municipal budgets (Canavire-
Bacarreza et al., 2012).
10 Peru is divided into 24 political regions, which in turn are divided into 196 provinces and 
into over 1,867 districts or municipalities. Regions and provinces are equivalent to states 
and counties in the US, respectively.
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By law, mining canon transfers can be used only for investment. 
This means that any project to be financed with canon funds has to fol-
low the rules of the Public Investment National System (SNIP, for its 
acronym in Spanish) and obtain the approval of the Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Finance. The law also prohibits recurring expenses, such 
as payroll within the local government. These restrictions limit the ca-
pacity of local governments to allocate canon funds to rent-sharing 
and embezzlement in contrast to the of Brazil experience reported by 
Caselli and Michaels (2013).11
11 This of course does no eliminate attempts to circumvent these restrictions. See Arellano-
Yanguas (2011) and Maldonado (2015) for more details.

 2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This paper combines many large administrative data sources and sev-
eral household level surveys to estimate the effect of mining produc-
tion and canon transfers on test scores, and to identify some of the 
important mechanisms that could lie behind any significant relation. 
The first dataset is the Evaluación Censal de Estudiantes (or ECE). This 
a national standardized test applied yearly since 2007 to all second 
graders in Peru in public and private schools.
Administered by the Ministry of Education, the ECE collects in-
formation about the students’ performance in math and reading (with 
possible scores ranging between 0 and 800 in each subject) plus a 
small set of students’ and schools’ characteristics (e.g., gender, mother 
tongue and type of school). These test scores are our main outcome 
variable.
Combining the tests scores from the ECE 2007 to 2012, our 
final sample contains over 2 million student records nationwide. Our 
sample includes all rural areas. We also include urban areas, except for 
the capital cities in each of the 24 regions. The exclusion of these larg-
est cities reflects the different social dynamics triggered by mining in 
these areas compared to rural and smaller cities (Zegarra et al., 2006; 
Arellano-Yanguas, 2008). 
Our second data source, the Censo Escolar (CE), allows us to 
collect yearly information about schools in terms of infrastructure, 
personnel and other administrative data. These include the share of 
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the teacher body with long-term contracts, access to electricity, water 
and sanitation, among others. As explained in the next section, we 
use some of these variables as additional controls (e.g., length of the 
school day, school administration, and percentage of girls enrolled) 
while others allow us to explore possible mechanisms (e.g., infrastruc-
ture and school personnel). 
We merge these datasets with yearly district-level data of min-
ing production and canon transfers. We obtain data on the value of 
mining production from the annual reports of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mining. We convert the reported volumes of copper, tin, iron, 
zinc, molybdenum, silver, gold, tungsten and cadmium, at the district 
level, into U.S. dollars using current international prices of the cor-
responding minerals. Canon transfers are the monetary amounts that 
each district receives annually from the central government. The Min-
istry of Finance compiles, computes, and reports these figures based 
on the amount of mining production in the districts themselves. This 
ministry is also the source of expenditures by local governments on 
education (and culture) by year. We also convert government transfers 
into U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates. We set all monetary 
values to 2010 prices using the US consumer price index, and express 
them in thousands of dollars per capita.12
Our fifth and final dataset allows us to explore other possible 
mechanisms, but at the household level. We use several years of the 
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (Enaho), a nationally representative 
household survey conducted by the Peruvian National Bureau of 
Statistics (INEI, for its acronym in Spanish) aimed at measuring living 
standards. Enaho allows us to estimate the effect of mining production 
12 To obtain per-capita values, we divide the values of canon transfers and production by 
population size estimates at the district level obtained from the Peruvian National Bureau 
of Statistics (INEI).
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and mining canon transfers on health outcomes of children as well as 
adults’ unemployment status.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for inputs and outputs. To 
facilitate the presentation we partition the sample into three groups: 
producing districts, non-producing districts but located in producing 
provinces, and non-producing districts in non-producing provinces. 
This classification follows the division created by the Canon Law. The 
table shows that districts in producing provinces, columns 1 and 2, 
present higher scores in math and reading on average than other dis-
tricts, as well as a higher proportion of schools with access to basic 
services and with better teacher-related outcomes. It also shows that 
non-producing districts in producing provinces show better outcomes 
than their counterparts, with mining activities, despite canon transfers 
are higher for the latter, suggesting the possible presence of non-linear 
effects.   

 3. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We exploit variation across districts and time in the value of the min-
ing activity and canon transfers. Our main specification is given by:
yisdt = α + g (mdt) + f (cdt) + δ1Xisdt + δ2Ssdt + γd + θt + εisdt          (1)
where yisdt is the test score for the student i, enrolled in school s, lo-
cated in district d observed in year t; mdt is the value of mining pro-
duction in district d in year t and cdt is the amount of canon transferred 
to district d in year t, both monetary measures are expressed in thou-
sands of US dollars per-capita at constant prices of 2010. X is a vector 
of socio-demographic characteristics of the student including gender 
and mother tongue; S is a vector of schools’ characteristics varying by 
time and space. These characteristics include: length of the school day 
(full-day, half-day morning or half-day afternoon); school administra-
tion type (public/private), school type (one-teacher school/full grade) 
and percentage of girls enrolled in the school. γd and θt denote district 
and year fixed effects respectively. εisdt is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the district level (over 1,800 in our sample).
Canon transfers depend on the value of taxes paid by mining com-
panies -which in turn depend not only on the value of production 
(determined by international prices) and the mineral produced in the 
locality- but also on the rules of the transfers discussed in Section 2. 
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Thus, our goal is to estimate whether, conditional on the value of min-
ing production, year-to-year variation in the amount of canon transfers 
received by the same district correlates with students’ test scores. 
As discussed in the introduction, models about the political 
economy of natural resources predict non-linear relationships (e.g., 
Caselli and Cunningham, 2009; Caselli and Tesei, 2011; Caselli, 
2015). Thus, we explore such predictions by allowing functions g (.) 
and f (.) to follow a polynomial of order two or more. 
Notice we do not control for lags of canon or mining production 
in our specification. In the case of mining canon, there is evidence sug-
gesting that mayors react to the transfers that they receive in any given 
year because not doing so could lead to higher political competition 
and higher likelihood that the central government will reduce trans-
fers due to low budget execution (e.g., Maldonado, 2015; Ardanaz 
and Maldonado, 2016). Furthermore, in the case of mining produc-
tion, previous studies have shown that the effect on market outcomes 
is contemporaneous (Jacobsen and Parker, 2014).
Changes in mining production could be correlated with unobserved 
variables that affect test scores, if for instance, mines are dispropor-
tionally located in poorer districts. In that case, our estimates of g(mdt) 
could be biased. We avoid this problem by focusing on the within-
district variation on the value of production. Therefore, our identi-
fication comes from year-to-year changes in the value of production 
in the same district, including districts that become producers during 
the period of analysis.13 Also, the inclusion of time-fixed effects al-
lows us to control for the possibility that unobserved factors alter test 
scores and mining production (as well as transfers) over time.
13 Only few districts become producers during the period of analysis. Eliminating them from 
our sample does not change our results (results available upon request).
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It is possible, however, that local governments may influence 
production decisions by investing in ways that attract mining com-
panies. As before, if the traits influencing investment decisions are 
time-invariant our district fixed-effect model will account for such 
characteristics. Also, the fact that starting a new exploitation requires 
seven years, on average, reduces the possibility that such traits drive 
our findings (Maldonado, 2014). Indeed, a new exploitation that 
started as a consequence of the mining boom would appear only at 
the end or after our period of analysis. Furthermore, by law, local 
governments play no role in the process of granting mining rights. 
Thus, it is unlikely that our findings are affected by local governments 
influencing production decisions. 
Barrantes et al. (2010) show that changes in the mining Canon 
Law were the product of circumstantial alliances between congress-
men from mineral rich regions and not the result of pressure from 
regional and local actors or the executive power. However, these nego-
tiations and changes in the law, took place in 2004, that is three years 
before our period of analysis. Moreover, these negotiations depended 
on time-invariant characteristics that are captured by our district-level 
fixed effects and thus, they provide further support to our identifica-
tion approach. Holding the investment capacity of the local govern-
ments constant, by the use of district fixed effects, we explore whether 
the year-to-year variation in the amount of transfers and mining pro-
duction helps in the formation of human capital measured by test 
scores.

 4. RESULTS
4.1 Effect of mining production
We start by considering the link between (the value of ) mining pro-
duction and student academic achievement ignoring, for the mo-
ment, the role of the canon. In Table 2 we show estimates of Equation 
(1) for math (Panel A) and reading (Panel B), when all fixed effects are 
included. We first consider a linear specification. For math, column 
(1), we find no significant association between mining production 
and student learning. The parameter is near zero both practically and 
statistically. When exploring a higher order polynomial (column 2) 
and the inclusion of school and children characteristics (columns 3 
and 4) the results remain unchanged. The absence of a statistically 
significant effect is also evident when we study the effect on reading 
outcomes (Panel B).
In Appendix Tables A1 and A2 we consider four heterogeneous 
effects of mining production by the location and type of the schools: 
urban, rural, public and private. As shown in those tables, we find no 
association between mining production and student achievement in 
those subsamples either, except for the case of rural schools, where we 
find a negative and statistically significant effect (p<0.05), albeit very 
small in both math and reading (Table A2). This effect persists when 
considering a higher order polynomial and when including schools’ 
and students’ characteristics. Mining production has also a weak 
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effect on math scores for urban schools, but this effect disappears 
after controlling for second-order polynomials and socio-economic 
characteristics. These findings suggest that, at best, the year-to-year 
variation in mining production has no effect on human capital 
accumulation, as measured by test scores.
4.2 Effect of canon transfers
We now consider the effect of the canon transfers on test scores. Table 
3 displays our estimates. We start with a simple model for math and 
reading, using a linear specification and ignoring the effects of pro-
duction but incorporating all the fixed effects. For both subjects, we 
find no association in this simplest model (column 1). However, a 
quadratic functional form suggests a nonlinear link for math but not 
for reading (column 2). For math, this pattern is consistent with the 
non-monotonic effects of resource booms highlighted by the political 
economy literature described earlier.
Adding controls for the value of mining production (column 3) 
as well as student and school characteristics (column 4) does not alter 
our findings: there are positive, statistically significant (but margin-
ally decreasing) effects for math, and negligible impacts for reading. 
Consistent with our previous analysis, the coefficient for mining pro-
duction is not statistically significant after controlling for canon and 
its square. 
Considering column 4, where all controls are included, the test-
score-maximizing amount of canon is about US$ 5,500 per capita 
per year. Conditional of receiving a transfer, the 99-percentile value 
of canon transfers is only US$ 1,313. Thus, for nearly all districts 
receiving canon, our findings suggest a positive effect of the transfers 
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on math test scores. Moreover, given that the average transfer during 
the period of our analysis is US$ 107 per capita for the sample of dis-
tricts that received strictly positive transfers, our estimates suggest an 
increase of around 23.5 percent of a standard deviation in math scores 
at this point of the distribution. 
To put our results in perspective, the average impact of the canon 
on test scores is higher than 83 percent of the studies reported by Kre-
mer et al. (2013) who analyze primary school interventions evaluated 
with randomized control trials. For example, based on the authors’ re-
view, our effect is larger than all the studies where “business as usual” 
resources are provided (e.g., textbook, class size, flipcharts) and all but 
two of the pedagogical innovations. The latter is relevant because one 
of the studies on pedagogical innovation provides contracts to teach-
ers (Duflo et al., 2012); as we will show below, one of the mechanisms 
that explain our findings is indeed the increase in the share of teachers 
with long-term contracts.
4.3 Robustness checks
a. Relaxing the parametric quadratic specification
The non-monotonic effects of mining canon on learning out-
comes are consistent with the political economy arguments dis-
cussed earlier but they strongly rely on the use a quadratic para-
metric approximation. To evaluate whether this approach is con-
sistent with the data, we extend the empirical model to include 
other polynomials and check whether they offer a better fit. 
Table A3 in the Appendix presents the results of the analysis. 
Columns 1 to 3 replicate the results for the basic specification 
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while we add cubic and quartic terms for mining canon in col-
umns 4 and 5. As a benchmark, we first test whether the coef-
ficients for the quadratic approximation are both equal to zero. 
We confidently reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients 
are equal to zero (F-statistic of 3.67 with a p-value of 0.03) for 
the case of math scores. For the case of the cubic and quadratic 
approximations, we implement a test for nested models in which 
the null hypothesis assumes that the quadratic approximation 
offers a better fit compared to alternative specifications. In both 
cases, we fail to reject the null: F-statistic of 0.73 with a p-value 
of 0.39 against the cubic specification and F-statistic of 0.59 with 
a p-value of 0.56 against the quartic one. Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that the quadratic approximation offers the best fit to the 
data. Similar results are obtained for reading (Panel B). 
b. Alternative samples of districts according to mining production 
One concern is that endogenous production responses may play 
a role even after controlling by mining production in the econo-
metric specifications. To address this issue, we take advantage of 
the fact that the mining Canon Law establishes that non-producer 
districts located in a producing province also receive a fraction of 
the rent generated by mining exploitation. This allows us to test 
the impact of the redistribution of natural resource rents in set-
tings where production externalities and production endogenous 
responses are not expected to play a role. 
For this purpose, we limit the sample to non-producing dis-
tricts located in a producing province. Table A4 in the Appendix 
presents the results. The coefficients are statistically significant 
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and larger than those reported in Table 3 for the basic specifica-
tion for math scores (Panel A, columns 1 and 2). This result is 
robust to controlling for student and school characteristics (col-
umn 3). As before, there is no effect for the case of reading scores 
(Panel B). Furthermore, in Table A5, we restrict the sample to 
non-producing districts but located in non-producing provinces. 
In this case, we find smaller positive impacts with diminishing 
marginal effects, but that are imprecise given the smaller variation 
in canon transfers.14 
 
c. Permutation tests
To further validate our empirical strategy, we consider falsifica-
tion tests by incorrectly assigning the time series of canon trans-
fers and mining production, {cdt, mdt}, that belong to district d 
to a randomly chosen district j from the set of all districts in the 
country. If unobserved characteristics, beyond the ones controlled 
with the district and year fixed-effects, are behind our findings for 
the canon transfers, we should expect this permutation exercise to 
produce non-zero impacts. In Figure 3, we show the distributions 
for the linear and quadratic coefficients from 10,000 permuta-
tions, after controlling for mining production. This is the same 
specification used in Table 3, column (3), whose benchmark pa-
rameter is reproduced here as the vertical dashed lines to ease the 
comparison. As expected, in Panels A (linear) and B (quadratic) 
we clearly observe that the incorrect assignment of canon transfers 
14 The coefficient of variation of the per-capita canon transfers for non-producing districts 
in non-producer provinces is 30 percent smaller compared to the variation for all other 
districts.
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produces estimates centered around zero (no effect). The original 
estimates are far away from these non-zero effects and they are 
unlikely to be generated by this (incorrect) random assignment 
given the shape of the density function. These results provide fur-
ther evidence of the validity of the identifying assumptions for 
our empirical strategy.15
4.4 Heterogeneous effects
In Table 4 we report regressions exploring heterogeneous effects re-
garding the public-private and urban-rural divides. In column (1) we 
reproduce the results for the entire sample to ease comparisons. The 
quadratic relationship is present in all subsamples except for private 
schools. This result is consistent with the fact that mining production 
has very limited impact on local economic conditions and provides 
additional support to the hypothesis that the main driver factor is 
political since Peruvian mayors seem to use mining canon funds to 
improve learning conditions in public schools. We will provide ad-
ditional evidence on this regard in the next section.
15 Note that the nature of the canon transfers makes it impossible to obtain valid inference if 
this incorrect random assignment is done when j is obtained from the region or province 
where d is located. As described in Section 2, districts in the same province or region of a 
producing district will receive a transfer that is correlated with the one received by district 
d. Thus, transfers to d and its neighboring districts are not spurious as is the case where j 
is drawn from any district in the country. In the Appendix, Figure A3, we show that when 
such permutations are done, the distribution of the incorrect permutations is not centered 
around zero. However, our estimates are away still located in low-probability regions for 
these distributions.
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4.5 Mechanisms
We now explore several mechanisms that could explain how the canon 
transfers increase academic performance, as measured by test scores. 
We do this by using the same identification strategy as before, but re-
placing the test scores outcomes in Equation (1) with new outcomes 
at the district, school and household level, depending on the dataset. 
We start by testing whether transfers increase local government’s 
expenditures on education (and cultural) items. In Table 5, column 
1, we show that canon transfers are positively associated with more 
education expenditure, using data at the district level. This effect is 
consistent with the results from Caselli and Michaels (2013), who 
find that oil windfalls in Brazil did increase local-government educa-
tion expenditure. Also in Brazil, but in the late 1980s, Litschig and 
Morrison (2013) find a positive effect on local expenditure on educa-
tion from intergovernmental transfers.
However, as discussed by Caselli and Michaels (2013), higher 
local expenditure on education is not a sufficient condition for better 
educational outcomes. For instance, while they find a positive effect 
on the education budget, there is no evidence that such expenditure 
translated into “measures of real outcomes” that led to material im-
provements (p. 224). Thus, we expand our set of outcomes to explore 
whether canon transfers created improvements in school infrastructure 
and the quality of teachers. Specifically, we use data from the Censo 
Escolar and test if variation in canon transfers relates to the hiring of 
teachers with long-term contracts (column 3), percentage of teachers 
with college degrees in education (columns 4) and basic infrastructure 
services in the school: electricity (column 5), water (column 6) and 
sanitation (column 7).
 We find that the canon is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with long-term contracts for teachers as well as improving 
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the access to electricity and sanitation in the schools. As shown in the 
Appendix, Tables A6 and A7, these effects are concentrated on rural 
and public schools. These findings also speak to the large literature 
about the role of resources on education outcomes (e.g., Hanushek, 
1996; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016). 
We also complement the work by Ferraz et al. (2012), who find that 
corruption has a negative effect on students’ academic performance in 
Brazil as politicians deviate resources away from education.
In column (2) of Table 5 we rule out the possibility that popula-
tion effects drive improvements in test scores. We find no effect on 
school enrollment from canon transfers, suggesting that larger wind-
falls did not seem to attract families with children.16 This is consistent 
with the work of Aragón and Rud (2013) who focused on Yanacocha, 
a large gold mine in Northern Peru. The authors also find no changes 
in the composition of the labor force—measured by education, gen-
der and portfolio of crops—using a difference-in-difference approach.
Yet, Loayza and Rigolini (2016), using the 2007 Peruvian popu-
lation census, find that areas with mining booms attracted skilled mi-
grants. Our results showing no effect on school enrollment could still 
be consistent with the Loayza and Rigolini’s findings, if migrants are 
not coming with their families. Such migration pattern would be con-
sistent with a household division of labor aimed at maximizing earn-
ings from work opportunities (e.g., Chant, 1991; Hugo, 2003, 2006). 
Also, Loayza and Rigolini’s analysis uses only data from 2007, which 
is the starting of our period of analysis. Thus, if skilled migration were 
temporary, circular, or concentrated at the beginning of the boom, 
our results would also be consistent with theirs. Furthermore, they 
16 Consistent with our previous results, we find no impact on enrollment for the case of 
public schools. However, we do find a non-monotonic effect in enrollment for the case of 
private schools. 
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base their empirical design on a cross-sectional variation that does not 
necessarily allow them to account for unobserved factors related to 
both, migration and mining production (or canon transfers). We base 
our design, in contrast, on a difference-in-difference approach, which 
avoids such a possibility; thus our research strategy could also explain 
these different findings.
We now use household-level data from Enaho to investigate 
whether changes in living standards at home also act as potential 
mechanisms (Table 6). This analysis complements and expands previ-
ous findings exploring the impacts of production and canon on con-
sumption and poverty using census data (Loayza and Rigolini, 2016), 
household surveys (Aragón and Rud, 2013) and both (Zambrano et 
al, 2014).
 For Table 6 we merge the Enaho household surveys from 2007 
to 2012 with the canon and mining datasets. In column (1) we show 
that there is a decline in adults’ unemployment status (aged between 
14 and 65) when transfers increase.17 In column (2) we find that this 
employment surge seems to occur due to an increase in public em-
ployment, although the relationship is non-monotonic, a result con-
sistent with the idea that politicians use public employment as an in-
strument to obtain political support.18 Other papers focused on Peru, 
cited above, did not explore these outcomes, so it is not possible to 
compare our findings with theirs. As shown in Table A8, in the Ap-
pendix, these results are mainly driven by schools in rural areas. 
We then explore the effects of canon transfers on per capita con-
sumption (column 4) and income (column 5). In these two cases, 
17 In the Enaho, employment is defined for individuals 14 years of age or older.
18 Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) have highlighted this mechanism from a theoretical 
point of view. Maldonado (2015) provides evidence on this regard for the Peruvian case 
for a different period than the one covered in this paper.  
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we do not find an effect. This null effect is not new. Aragón and Rud 
(2013) and Zambrano et al. (2014), suggests that, if any, the effects 
of windfalls on these outcomes tend to be concentrated at the bottom 
of their distributions.19 These authors observe a negative relationship 
between canon transfers and poverty and inequality, when comparing 
districts in 2007 and 2011, nationwide. 
Furthermore, we evaluate whether canon transfers, through the 
expansion of the public education budget, created a crowding-out 
effect on household’s education expenditures. As discussed by Todd 
and Wolpin (2003), parents could alter their behavior when more re-
sources are brought to their children’s schools, affecting the evaluation 
of education policies. In particular, previous work (e.g., Das et al., 
2013) has shown that parents reduce education expenditures when 
schools receive more (unanticipated) funds.20 We test for evidence of 
crowding-out behavior in column (3) of Table 6, where the outcome 
is now household education expenditure per-student, using Enaho. 
We do not find evidence of crowding-out at the household level, sug-
gesting that parents do not see their inputs as substitutes with respect 
to school-based inputs.21 
Finally, also using the Enaho, we test whether the canon im-
proves health conditions of adults and children (aged 6-10). As dis-
cussed by Litschig and Morrison (2013), investigating the impact of 
intergovernmental transfers on health outcomes is a natural step when 
understanding whether such transfers could improve human capital. 
19 Our null effects on consumption and income do differ from Loayza and Rigolini (2016), 
but as explained above, these disparities could arise from differences in methodological 
approaches and period of analysis.
20 See also Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) for an empirical applications showing evidence 
of crowding-out in parental behavior when students go a better school.
21 See Litschig and Morrison (2013) for a discussion of the “flypaper effect” and crowding 
out on own revenue and other revenue sources among local governments in the presence 
of intergovernmental transfers
37Results
In Table 7 we consider three (self-reported) indicators: having health 
complications in the last four weeks, whether the individual felt sick 
in the last four weeks and the number of days an individual between 
15 and 64 years of age that could not work due to being sick. Our re-
sults indicate that canon transfers are associated with health improve-
ments. We observe a decline in the probability of experiencing health 
complications for adults and children (columns 1 and 2), as well as a 
decline in the probability of being sick recently (but for adults only, 
column 3). The results are essentially the same for urban and rural 
areas (Table A9 in the Appendix). 

 5. CONCLUSIONS
We studied whether booms of natural resources affect human capital 
accumulation, exploiting a natural experiment in Peru’s mining sec-
tor, a country with low governance indicators. In general, this is a 
challenging task because it is difficult to isolate possible unobserved 
factors affecting the resource booms -and their redistribution- as 
well as human capital investments. Furthermore, from a theoretical 
point of view, the effects are ambiguous. For instance, changes in min-
ing production can improve labor market opportunities, making it 
possible for households to invest more in education, but it can also 
affect students’ performance if they generate negative environmental 
and health-related externalities.
On the other hand, the literature has linked resource booms to 
increases in natural resource rents to local governments, implying an 
increasing access to fiscal funds that incumbents could use to build 
schools, hire better teachers and distribute school inputs.
We find non-monotonic effects of the redistribution of mining 
rents on math scores, but no effect for the case of reading. The for-
mer effect is positive and large: 0.23 standard deviations for the aver-
age municipality, implying that the mining boom in Peru has been 
beneficial for students in almost all recipient localities. The net effect 
is negative only for extremely canon-rich municipalities (top 1% in 
terms of mining canon distribution). These results are in line with 
recent scholarship documenting non-monotonic and perverse effects 
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for natural resource-rich regions. This evidence is also consistent with 
a political economy argument where mayors invest in public goods 
when they expect to keep power, but underinvest when they face less 
political competition. In fact, we find that these effects are mainly 
driven by public schools and by changes in school-level conditions 
such as infrastructure and better labor conditions for teachers. These 
are ways in which incumbents can invest mining canon transfers. 
We did not find impacts of mining production on learning out-
comes. This result is important, since it helps to identify the causal 
mechanism as a political one when redistributive mechanisms are in 
place. The redistribution fueled by the resource boom had a limited 
impact on improving households’ economic conditions, with a weak 
impact on reducing unemployment. Interestingly, only public em-
ployment reacted to the boom, congruent with a theoretical mecha-
nism that indicates that politicians use public employment as a cli-
entelistic tool to obtain political support. The non-monotonic effect 
found for public employment is consistent in this regard. 
In addition, we also find non-monotonic effects for the case of 
health variables. These results can be a consequence of improvements 
in the quality and access to health facilities, something that has been 
documented in other studies (Ardanaz and Maldonado 2016; Maldo-
nado 2015). 
The evidence presented in this paper puts into question some be-
liefs in the literature about the role of natural resources in develop-
ment. Recent studies have emphasized that natural resources can be 
a “blessing” only when good institutions are available. However, we 
have shown that a natural resource boom can lead to an increase of 
human capital accumulation in a context of poor institutions, but only 
when mechanisms of distribution of natural resource windfalls are in 
place. Moreover, we find that only extremely canon-rich municipalities 
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experience negative effects of a resource boom. This may explain the 
anecdotal evidence of the resource curse literature, typically motivated 
by highlighting the economic and political distortions experienced by 
extreme natural wealth in the Middle East or Africa. Thus, natural 
resources can lead to a curse only for extremely natural resource-rich 
societies, and it can potentially be a blessing for the rest.
Undoubtedly, the effect of natural resource booms on academic 
achievement deserves further research, in particular under different 
institutional set-ups and windfalls-redistribution schemes. Focusing 
on the Peruvian case, perhaps one important question that remains 
open for discussion is: What are the long-term effects of mining pro-
duction on the social outcomes here analyzed once the boom ends? 
Jacobsen and Parker (2014) find long-lived negative effects in the la-
bor markets after the end of the 1970s gas and oil bonanza in the 
United States. However, we have not seen evidence documenting the 
long-run effects on human capital formation after the bust. Another 
question that remains open to consideration is the identification of 
the heterogeneous impact of canon on different test subjects. As docu-
mented, we observe an impact of canon transfers on math test scores, 
but not on reading scores. This deserves further research. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Descriptive statistics. Averages 2007-2012
  
 Producing Non-producing Non-producing
 districts districts in districts in
 (1) producing non-producing
  provinces provinces
  (2) (3)
A. Learning, as measured by "Evaluación Censal de Estudiantes" (score)
Average scores in mathematics 517.06 534.04 509.17
Average scores in reading 514.73 532.49 508.46
Number of students 110868 409626 1565804
B. Schools' characteristics, as measured by "Censo Escolar" (%)
Teachers with long-term contract 28.56 31.23 27.79
Teachers with a tertiary education degree
in a school teaching program 97.44 97.08 94.54
Schools with access to electricity 71.24 74.96 60.48
Schools with access to water 65.86 68.97 54.96
Schools with access to sanitation 74.83 76.46 72.12
Number of schools 5794 22771 83361
C. Districts' characteristics
Mining production per-capita† 15513 0.00 0.00
Canon transfers per-capita† 0.37 0.19 0.04
Number of districts 128 554 1156
† Thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010, divided by total population at the district 
level. The total number of habitants for each district and year are obtained from Peru’s Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics (INEI). Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Peru’s 
Ministries of Education, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table 2
Effects of mining production on academic achievement
Dependent variable: Test scores
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Math scores
Mining production 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Mining production squared  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0062 0.0062 0.0146 0.0171
Number of students  2,072,339 2,072,339 2,016,774 2,012,798
Panel B. Reading scores
Mining production -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Mining production squared  -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000**
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0266 0.0266 0.0509 0.0638
Number of students 2,068,271 2,068,271 2,011,922 2,008,941
Student controls N N Y Y
School controls N N N Y
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at ten 
percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Mining corresponds to 
the value of mining production per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. 
All regressions include fixed effects at the district level and by year. School characteristics 
include: school day (full-day, half-day morning or half-day afternoon); school administration 
type (public/private), and school type (one-teacher school/full grade). Student characteristics 
include: gender and mother language (Spanish/other) of the children. Source: Authors’ cal-
culations based data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, 
and INEI.
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Table 3
Effects of canon on academic achievement
  
Dependent variable: Test scores
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Math scores
Canon 6.9139 21.6714** 21.7054** 24.0105**
  (4.6448) (9.5905) (9.6360) (9.4667)
Canon squared  -1.9654** -1.9679** -2.1754***
   (0.8429) (0.8453) (0.8285)
Mining production   -0.0000 -0.0000
    (0.0001) (0.0001)
R-squared 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0172
Number of students 2,072,339 2,072,339 2,072,339 2,012,798
Panel B. Reading scores
Canon -0.6112 -2.6721 -2.5545 -2.8542
  (1.7751) (4.3260) (4.3682) (4.5153)
Canon squared  0.2743 0.2656 0.2731
   (0.3728) (0.3743) (0.3848)
Mining production   -0.0001 -0.0001
    (0.0001) (0.0001)
R-squared 0.0266 0.0266 0.0266 0.0638
Number of students 2,068,271 2,068,271 2,068,271 2,007,595
Student controls N N N Y
School controls N N N Y
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at 
ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Mining and canon 
correspond to the value of mining production per-capita and canon per-capita, in thousands 
of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions include fixed effects at the district level 
and by year. School characteristics include: school day (full-day, half-day morning or half-day 
afternoon); school administration type (public/private), and school type (one-teacher school/
full grade). Student characteristics include: gender and mother language (Spanish/other) of 
the children. Source: Authors’ calculations based data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of 
Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table 4
Heterogeneous effects of canon on academic achievement
Sample
  All Urban Rural Private Public
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Math scores
Canon 24.0105** 25.2195** 20.6906** -3.6998 25.6681***
  (9.4667) (11.2634) (9.8223) (17.1192) (9.2483)
Canon squared -2.1754*** -2.2646** -2.0861** -0.1889 -2.2894***
  (0.8285) (0.9788) (0.8627) (1.2898) (0.8677)
Mining production -0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
R-squared 0.0172 0.0164 0.0142 0.0170 0.0146
Number of students  2012798   1353896   653410   299441   1713357 
Panel B. Reading scores
Canon -2.8542 0.0939 0.7575 -23.603** 1.2046
  (4.5153) (4.5661) (7.5111) (10.6427) (4.6143)
Canon squared 0.2731 -0.0277 -0.0073 1.9557** -0.1657
  (0.3848) (0.3881) (0.6579) (0.7954) (0.4108)
Mining production -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R-squared 0.0638 0.0554 0.0319 0.0333 0.0512
Number of students  2008941   1351621   651838   299302   1709639 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at 
ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Mining and canon 
correspond to the value of mining production per-capita and canon per-capita, in thousands 
of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions include fixed effects at the district level and 
by year.  School characteristics include: school day (full-day, half-day morning or half-day 
afternoon); school administration type (public/private), and school type (one-teacher school/
full grade). Student characteristics include: gender and mother language (Spanish/other) of 
the children. Source: Authors’ calculations based data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of 
Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Figure 1
Natural resources and test scores
 
Note: Data for the test scores come from the 2012 PISA and the share of GDP from total 
natural resources (2011-2012 average) comes from the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators (code: NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS) and represents the sum of rents from oil, natural gas, 
coal (hard and soft), mineral, and forest. Data for this graph can be downloaded from http://
www.oecd.org/pisa/ and http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-de-
velopment-indicators
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Figure 2
Spending per student in primary education and test scores
 
Note: Data for the test scores come from the 2012 PISA and the share of GDP from gover-
nment expenditure in primary education per student (2011-2012 average) comes from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (code: SE.XPD.PRIM.PC.ZS) and includes 
current, capital, and transfers. Data for this graph can be downloaded from http://www.oecd.
org/pisa/ and http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators
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Figure 3
Mining canon transfer randomizations
A. Kernel density estimate for the coefficient of canon
 
B. Kernel density estimate for the coefficient of canon squared
 
Bandwidth: 0.2
Note: In the corresponding regressions, mining and canon correspond to the value of mining 
production per-capita and canon per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. 
All regressions include fixed effects at the district level and by year. The regressions do not 
include school characteristics or student characteristics. Source: Authors’ calculations based 
data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Online Appendix - Not for publication
Figure A
Trends in mining exports
A. Total mining exports, 2000-2015
B. Exports by mineral, 2006-2012
   
Note: Shaded area (Panel A) indicates the period of analysis (2007-2012). Data for this graph 
can downloaded from http://www.bcrp.gob.pe/.
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Figure A2
Trends in canon transfers
A. Total canon transfers: 2000-2015
 
B. Canon transfers among top 8 receiving districts, 2007-2012 
Note: Shaded area (top figure) indicates the period of analysis (2007-2012). 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Peru’s Ministry of Finance.
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Figure A3
Mining canon transfer stratified randomizations
A. Kernel density estimate for the coefficient of canon
 
B. Kernel density estimate for the coefficient of canon squared
 
Bandwidth: 0.2
Note: In the corresponding regressions, mining and canon correspond to the value of mining 
production per-capita and canon per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. 
All regressions include fixed effects at the district level. The regressions do not include school 
characteristics or student characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of Finance, 
of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table A3
Robustness check: Evaluating parametric specification
                                                                    Dependent variable: Test scores
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Math scores
Canon 6.9139 21.6714** 21.7054** 17.8974 15.8582
  (4.6448) (9.5905) (9.6360) (14.1336) (18.9668)
Canon squared   -1.9654** -1.9679** 0.1377 2.5463
    (0.8429) (0.8453) (3.7444) (10.2298)
Mining production     -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
      (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cubic canon       -0.1818 -0.7278
        (0.2622) (1.7987)
Quartic canon         0.0335
          (0.0971)
F-test for quadratic specification    3.67    
      [0.0257]    
F-test for nested models comparison:   0.73  
     Quadratic versus Cubic model   [0.3926]  
F-test for nested models comparison:    0.59
     Quadratic versus Quartic model    [0.5561]     
Number of students 2072339 2072339 2072339 2072339 2072339
Panel B. Reading scores
Canon -0.6112 -2.6721 -2.5545 -4.2865 -5.0807
  (1.7751) (4.3260) (4.3682) (5.9043) (7.4625)
Canon squared   0.2743 0.2656 1.2222 2.1613
    (0.3728) (0.3743) (1.5516) (4.2778)
Mining production     -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
      (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cubic canon       -0.0826 -0.2953
        (0.1128) (0.7865)
Quartic canon         0.0131
          (0.0434) 
67Appendix
                                                                    Dependent variable: Test scores
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F-test for quadratic specification    0.72    
      [0.4872]    
F-test for nested models comparison:   0.42  
     Quadratic versus Cubic model     [0.5167]  
F-test for nested models comparison:    0.22
     Quadratic versus Quartic model        [0.8063]
Number of students 2068271 2068271 2068271 2068271 2068271
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at 
ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Mining and canon 
correspond to the value of mining production per-capita and canon per-capita, in thousands 
of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions include fixed effects at the district level 
and by year. School characteristics include: school day (full-day, half-day morning or half-day 
afternoon); school administration type (public/private), and school type (one-teacher school/
full grade). Student characteristics include: gender and mother language (Spanish/other) of 
the children.  Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Peru’s Ministries of Educa-
tion, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table A4
Robustness check: Non-producing districts
Non-producing districts in producing provinces
                                                          Dependent variable: Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Math scores 
Canon 15.3272** 42.9592*** 42.9592*** 44.0927***
  (7.2185) (9.2665) (9.2665) (9.2499)
Canon squared   -4.0120*** -4.0120*** -4.1620***
    (0.8158) (0.8158) (0.8099)
R-squared 0.0062 0.0067 0.0067 0.0204
Number of students 407870 407870 407870 400466
Panel B. Reading scores 
Canon -3.8087 -5.3912 -5.3912 -4.5662
  (2.4266) (5.6013) (5.6013) (5.6375)
Canon squared   0.2281 0.2281 0.0850
    (0.4882) (0.4882) (0.4810)
R-squared 0.0210 0.0210 0.0210 0.0597
Number of students 407261 407261 407261 399885
Student controls N N Y Y
School controls N N N Y
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at ten 
percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Canon corresponds to 
the value of canon per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions 
include fixed effects at the district level and by year. School characteristics include: school day 
(full-day, half-day morning or half-day afternoon); school administration type (public/priva-
te), and school type (one-teacher school/full grade). Student characteristics include: gender 
and mother language (Spanish/other) of the children. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table A5
Robustness check: Non-producing districts
Non-producing districts in non-producing provinces
  Dependent variable: Scores 
 (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Math scores 
Canon 3.0216 11.3721 14.4347
  (7.0492) (20.0901) (20.2367)
Canon squared  -0.9788 -1.2158
   (1.7309) (1.7321)
R-squared 0.0055 0.0055 0.0163
Number of students 840,920 840,920 817,235
Panel B. Reading scores 
Canon 2.6782 4.2645 3.4589
  (1.9732) (6.4470) (7.2205)
Canon squared  -0.1866 -0.0914
   (0.5473) (0.6094)
R-squared 0.0242 0.0242 0.0600
Number of students 839,965 839,965 816,281
Student controls N N Y
School controls N N Y
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at ten 
percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Canon corresponds to 
the value of canon per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions 
include fixed effects at the district level and by year. School characteristics include: school day 
(full-day, half-day morning or half-day afternoon); school administration type (public/priva-
te), and school type (one-teacher school/full grade). Student characteristics include: gender 
and mother language (Spanish/other) of the children. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
data from Peru’s Ministries of Education, of Finance, of Energy and Mines, and INEI.
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Table A8
Mechanisms based on economic conditions by area
Dependent variables
 Unemployed Employed  Spending on Monthly Monthly
 (14 - 65 in the education consumption income 
 years of age) public sector per-student per-capita per-capita 
  (14 - 65 
  years of age) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Urban
Canon -0.0340 0.0189 0.0097 -0.0995 -0.0771
 (0.0417) (0.0770) (0.1936) (0.0867) (0.1104)
Canon squared -0.0011 -0.0056 -0.0428 0.0440* 0.0716**
 (0.0176) (0.0207) (0.0977) (0.0236) (0.0331)
Mining production 0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0093 -0.0008 0.0040
 (0.0049) (0.0030) (0.0084) (0.0115) (0.0085)
R-squared 0.0004 0.0009 0.0256 0.0284 0.0229
Number of observations  343629   84713   49864   83190   83184 
Panel B. Rural
Canon -0.0677* 0.3150*** 0.1160 -0.0805 0.0601
 (0.0371) (0.0893) (0.2062) (0.1044) (0.1300)
Canon squared 0.0292* -0.1211** -0.1839* -0.0509 -0.1048
 (0.0152) (0.0503) (0.1040) (0.0423) (0.0650)
Mining production 0.0011 -0.0100*** 0.0205* 0.0066 0.0015
 (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0116) (0.0078) (0.0050)
R-squared 0.0005 0.0164 0.0579 0.0612 0.0437
Number of observations  230581   32730   28372   53665   53665 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * Significant at ten per-
cent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Mining corresponds to the value 
of mining production per-capita, in thousands of USD at constant prices of 2010. All regressions 
include fixed effects at the district level and by year. None of the regressions include school cha-
racteristics. Source: Authors’ compilations based on Enaho household survey data and data from 
Peru’s Ministry of Finance and Peru’s Ministry of Mines and Energy.
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